Optimal Information Management : Organizations versus Markets

info:eu-repo/semantics/publishe

On the Political Economics of Tax Reforms

There is often a gap between the prescriptions of an “optimal” tax system and actual tax systems, some of which can be neither efficient economically nor efficient at redistributing income. With a focus on personal income taxes, this paper reviews the political economics literature on tax systems and reforms to see whether political mechanisms allow us to better understand why tax systems look the way they look. Finally, we exploit a database of reforms in labour taxation in the European Union to check the determinants of all reforms, on the one hand, and of targeted reforms, on the other hand. The results fit well with political economy theories and show that political variables carry more weight in triggering reforms than economic variables. This shed light on whether and how tax reforms are achievable. It also explains why many reforms that seem economically optimal fail to be implemented.political economy, taxation, personal income tax

How Trump triumphed: Multi-candidate primaries with buffoons

While people on all sides of the political spectrum were amazed that Donald Trump won the Republican nomination this paper demonstrates that Trump's victory was not a crazy event but rather the equilibrium outcome of a multi-candidate race where one candidate, the buffoon, is viewed as likely to self-destruct and hence unworthy of attack. We model such primaries as a truel (a three-way duel), solve for its equilibrium, and test its implications in a laboratory experiment. We find that people recognize a buffoon when they see one and aim their attacks elsewhere with the unfortunate consequence that the buffoon has an enhanced probability of winning. This result is strongest amongst those subjects who demonstrate an ability to best respond suggesting that our results would only be stronger when the game is played by experts and for higher stakes

Interactions between contact lenses and lens care solutions: Influence in optical properties

Purpose: Investigate changes in optical properties of contact lenses materials (transmittance and reflectance) and lens care solutions (absorption and fluorescence) resulting from its interaction. Methods: From an experimental study, triplicate measurements of transmittance and reflectance of five contact lenses (Senofilcon A, Lotrafilcon B, Balafilcon A, Comfilcon A, and Omafilcon A), as well as UV-vis absorption and fluorescence of four lens care solutions (LCS) (ReNu MultiPlus, Biotrue, OPTI-FREE PureMoist, and AOSept Plus), were evaluated before and after 8 h, one day and one week in storage. The outcomes were provided by Shimadzu UV3101-PC UV-vis-NIR spectrophotometer equipped with an integrating sphere, between 200-700 nm, and SPEX-Fluorolog 2 FL3-22 spectrofluorometer. Results: All variables exhibited statistically significant differences over time. Comfilcon A showed the lowest ultraviolet radiation (UVR) A & B attenuation. Balafilcon A and Lotrafilcon B displayed a slight suppression of UVR. Senofilcon A was effective in UVR protection and showed less effect on the fluorescence of lens care solutions. Overall, the reflectance decreased after storage (p < 0.05). AOSept Plus absorbance and fluorescence demonstrated lower interactions than multipurpose solutions (MPS), and Lotrafilcon B induced more remarkable changes in optical properties of LCS than the other materials. Conclusion: The findings suggest that optical variables of lens care solutions and contact lenses changed mutually after storage, probably associated with biochemical and biophysical interactions between components and the release of some polymer compounds. These findings can provide additional information about the interaction of CL materials and LCS in clinical behavior.This work was supported by the Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology (FCT-Portugal) in the framework of the Strategic Funding of CF-UM-UP (UIDB/04650/2020)

Party Organization and Electoral Competition

We propose a model in which two parties select the internal organization that helps them win the election. Party choices provide incent

Electoral competition through issue selection

Politics must tackle multiple issues at once. In a first-best world, political competition constrains parties to prioritize issues according to the voters' true concerns. In the real world, the opposite also happens: parties manipulate voter priorities by emphasizing issues selectively during the political campaign. This phenomenon, known as priming, should allow parties to pay less attention to the issues that they intend to mute. We develop a model of endogenous issue ownership in which two vote-seeking parties (i) invest to attract voters with "better" policy proposals and (ii) choose a communication campaign to focus voter attention on specific issues. We identify novel feedbacks between communication and investment. In particular, we find that stronger priming effects can backfire by constraining parties to invest more resources in all issues, including the ones they would otherwise intend to mute. We also identify under which conditions parties prefer to focus on their "historical issues" or to engage in issue stealing. Typically, the latter happens when priming effects are strong, and historical reputations differentiates parties less

Electoral competition through issue selection

Trabajo presentado al "Lisbon Meeting on Institutions and Political Economy" Lisboa 2011 y al "VII Workshop on Social Decisions" Malaga 2011.Politics must tackle multiple issues at once. In a first-best world, political competition constrains parties to prioritize issues according to the voters’ true concerns. In the real world, the opposite also happens: parties manipulate voter priorities by emphasizing issues selectively during the political campaign. This phenomenon, known as priming, should allow parties to pay less attention to the issues that they intend to mute. We develop a model of endogenous issue ownership in which two vote-seeking parties (i) invest to attract voters with “better” policy proposals and (ii) choose a communication campaign to focus voter attention on specific issues. We identify novel feedbacks between communication and investment. In particular, we find that stronger priming effects can backfire by constraining parties to invest more resources in all issues, including the ones they would otherwise intend to mute. We also identify under which conditions parties prefer to focus on their “historical issues” or to engage in issue stealing. Typically, the latter happens when priming effects are strong, and historical reputations differentiates parties less.Aragones acknowledges financial support by the Generalitat de Catalunya Grant number 2009 SGR 1126, the Spanish Ministry of Education grant number ECO2009-08820 and the Barcelona Graduate School of Economics. Castanheira is FNRS research fellow and he thanks them for their financial support. Castanheira and Giani received funding from the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2009-2013) under Grant Agreement nº244725 (GRASP).Peer Reviewe

Why Vote for Losers?

Voting Theory generally concludes that, in first-past-the-post elections, all votes should go to effective candidates (Duverger’s Law), and parties should adopt a similar platform (Median Voter Theorem). Such predictions are not always met in practice, however. We show why divergence and vote dispersion is a natural outcome when (i) parties are opportunistic, (ii) there is uncertainty on the position of the median voter and (iii) elections are repeated. ‘Voting for losers’ increases the informational content of elections, and may induce mainstream parties to relocate towards extremists. As a result, to maximize their probability of being elected, they do not adopt median platforms, but instead diverge to a certain extent.Duverger's Law; Poisson Games; signalling; voting

Why Vote for Losers?

Voting Theory generally concludes that -in first-past-the-post elections- 1) All voters should go to effective candidates (Duverger's Law); 2) Parties' platform should converge (Median Voter Theorem). Observations, though, suggest that such predictions are not met in practice. We show that divergence and dispersion of votes is a natural election outcome when there is uncertainty and repetition of elections. "Voting for Losers" increases the informational content of elections, and forces main parties to relocate towards extremists. As a result, they maximize their probability of being elected, not by converging to the median but by diverging to a certain extent. Ideological behavior results then from optimizing considerations alone.